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APPLICABILITY OF Boys Markets INJUNCTIONS TO SYMPATHY STRUKMS
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975)
While negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the Buffalo
Forge Co., union locals representing the company's office and technical
employees struck and picketed the company's facilities.1  Other locals,
affiliated with the same union and representing the company's produc-
tion and maintenance workers, honored the picket lines and ordered a
sympathy strike.2 Since the collective bargaining agreement with the
production and maintenance unions contained mandatory arbitration'
and no-strike4 provisions, the company sought a preliminary injunction5
of the secondary work stoppage under section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.0 The district court denied injunctive re-
1. The company recognized the legality of the office workers' picket lines. Brief
for Appellant at 4-5, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975).
2. 517 F.2d at 1209. A sympathy strike is a work stoppage prompted by defer-
ence to another union's grievance rather than aimed at extracting a direct concession
from the employer. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953). In
this instance, both unions were local affiliates of the same international union, the steel-
workers.
The sympathy strike terminated the day after the district court denied the company's
request for injunction. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405
(W.D.N.Y. 1974). The issue was not moot, however, because the office workers re-
mained on strike during the period of the appeal, and the work stoppage could have been
resumed at any time. 517 F.2d at 1210.
3. The arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement applied to all
"questions as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the Agreement." Brief
for Appellees, Attachment B at 17, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975) (agreement between Buffalo Forge Co. and the
United Steelworkers). The agreement stipulated that the arbitrator's decisions would
bind both parties. Id.
4. Id. at 16: 'There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruptions or imped-
ing of work."
5. For an excellent discussion of the different practical procedural considerations
involved in the various forms of injunctive relief-temporary restraining orders, prelim-
inary and permanent injunctions, see Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets De-
cision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. INm. & COM. L. REV. 893, 950-57 (1975).
6. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1970) provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
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lief." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed8 and held:
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes enjoining a sympathy
strike even though the union is subject to mandatory arbitration and a
no-strike clause.9
The Norris-LaGuardia Act'0 deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to
jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the amount in controversy or with-
out regard to the citizenship of the parties.
7. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
The district court found "no arbitrable grievance between the parties" because the under-
lying dispute involved the company and the office workers' union. Id. at 410-11.
The district court refused to follow several cases in which injunctions had been
pranted and which plaintiff argued were controlling; the court found those arbitration
clauses broader than that in Buffalo Forge. Id. at 410, distinguishing Inland Steel Co.
v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974) (arbitration clause covered "matters
not specifically mentioned"); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d
321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974) (clause "covered the union's honoring
a primary strike against the employer"); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen's
Local 1429, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (collective
bargaining agreement provided "for the union's honoring a 'bona fide' picket line").
The district court also considered five cases that "dealt with agreements which con-
tained no additional language.. . ..." 386 F. Supp. at 410, citing Monongahela Power
Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (injunction issued); Amstar
Corp v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972) (injunction de-
nied); Barnard College v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in-
junction issued); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478
(D. Md. 1971) (injunction denied); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208,
IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970) (injunction denied). The district court
concluded:
Although [Monongahela Power and Barnard College] appear to support plain-
tiff's position, nevertheless, the court finds that the cases in which injunction
was denied are controlling [because there was no contractual restriction on the
union's right to honor other unions picket lines].
386 F. Supp. at 410.
The district court also rejected the company's contention that the sympathy strike
arose out of a disagreement about work assignments. If the evidence had sustained that
contention, there would have been an arbitrable grievance and grounds for an injunction.
See text accompanying note 32 infra.
8. The appeal arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1970), which governs ap-
peals of interlocutory orders, including injunctions. 517 F.2d at 1209.
9. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975).
10. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or in-
terested in such dispute... from ....
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
Congress mandated this laissez faire approach in response to what it perceived to be
abuses of the injunctive power in labor controversies. Arco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW,
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enjoin labor disputes except in limited circumstances."1 The legislation
encouraged collective bargaining, and implicitly recognized the strike as
a legitimate means to that end.12 The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)13 continued the national commitment to collective bargaining,
and expressly recognized the right of employees to organize and engage
in concerted activities. 4 As labor organizations expanded,15' industrial
459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Team-
sters, 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972). For an excellent documentation of the abuses
prompting the Act, see F. FRANKFURTER & F. GREtE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
11. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (strike against federal
government enjoined); Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S. 287
(1941) (picketing attended by violence enjoined).
Generally, as a prerequisite to an injunction, the court must find that unlawful acts
have been threatened and would be committed unless restrained. In addition, the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act conditions injunctive relief on satisfaction of certain procedural safe-
guards including notice, a full hearing, and findings of fact. 29 U.S.C. § 107-109
(1970). See Axelrod, supra note 5, at 945-50.
12. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970):
Mhe public policy of the United States is declared as follows: .. . the indi-
vidual unorganized worker . . . shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor. . . in self-organization or other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining ....
The Act's legislative history reveals that Congress intended to recognize strikes as an
appropriate form of action. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1932),
reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES LABOR OROAIZATIONS 168 (R.
Koretz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as STATuToRY HISTORY].
13. 29 U.S.C. § 151-66 (1940), as amended, 29 U.S.C. H§ 151-66 (1970).
14. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970):
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to [promote] the free
flow of commerce by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining and . . . protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing
For a synopsis of the legislative history of the Act, see STATUTORY HISTORY 277-347.
Section 157 established the right of workers to join unions, bargain collectively, honor
picket lines, and strike or picket. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization
. . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
.... " National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1940), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Under the NLRA, employees' right to honor picket lines received federal protection.
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1953). Discussion of
whether a sympathy strike should be enjoined is complicated by this right and the neces-
sary result of an injunction-infringement of the right to honor a picket line. See Note,
Boys Markets Injunctions in Sympathy Strike Situations, 6 LOYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 644
(1975); Note, The Fruits of Boys Markets, 53 TEXAs L. REv. 1086 (1975).
15. One measure of the success of the NLRA was the growth of unions. Their
membership increased from three million in 1936 to almost fifteen million in 1945. W.
OBERNER & IY, HANSLOWE, LABOR LAV: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY
149 (1972).
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peace,1 achieved through arbitration and collective bargaining,'"
emerged in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA)"8
as the principal objective of federal labor policy.19 Section 301(a) of
the LMRA -0 furthered that aim by allowing suits to enforce collective
bargaining agreements. 21
Recognizing the pro-arbitration foundations of the LMRA, the Su-
preme Court held in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills22 that, despite the
prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,23 section 301(a) granted
16. Labor Management Relations Act § I(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970). In reac-
tion to the labor unrest that followed World War II, Congress became concerned with
maintaining industrial peace. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947),
reprinted in STATUToRY HISToRY 613-16; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1947) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY 589-90.
17. By the language of the Act, Congress gave the strongest possible approval to
arbitration as the preferred means of settling disputes. Labor Management Relations
Act § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1970). SENATE REPORT 13-14, reprinted in STATUTORY
HISTORY 603-04. Some authorities argue that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, particularly §
108, which preconditions an injunction on an agreement to arbitrate, and the LMRA
are consistent in favoring arbitration, though to different degrees. See Keene, The Su-
preme Court, Section 301, and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Be-
yond, 15 VrLL. L. REV. 32 (1969). See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 458 (1957).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-82, 185-87 (1970), amending 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-58 (1940).
19. See source quoted note 26 infra.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra. Accommodating § 301(a)
with § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is difficult because Congress failed to enunciate
the relationship between the acts. Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions,
79 YALE L.J. 1593, 1594 n.18 (1970). Congress did not intend § 301(a) to repeal the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962),
overruled on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970).
21. Congress intended that this enforcement provision would induce unions and em-
ployers to enter and adhere to collective bargaining agreements. SENATE REPORT 16-
18, reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY 606, 608.
22. 353 U.S. 448 (1957), noted in Kramer, In the Wake of Lincoln Mills, 9 LA3.
L.J. 835 (1958); Note, Lincoln Mills: Labor Arbitration and Federal-State Relations,
57 COLUM. L. REv. 1123 (1957); Note, Federal Enforcement of Grievance Arbitration
Provisions under the Doctrine of Lincoln Mills, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1139 (1958). In
Lincoln Mills, the union and the employer were parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment. A grievance arose over work assignments, and the union exercised its right to
refer the matter to arbitration. When the employer refused to arbitrate, the union suc-
cessfully sought specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate. 353 U.S. at 449.
23. The Court in Lincoln Mills rejected the employer's contention that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prohibited specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate, remarking
that "a [refusal] to arbitrate was not part and parcel of the abuses against which the
Act was aimed." 353 U.S. at 458.
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jurisdiction to federal courts to compel specific performance of arbitra-
tion agreements.24 In the Steelworkers Trilogy,25 the Court recognized
arbitration as a crucial element of national labor policy.20 The Court
formulated a presumption of arbitrability27 to resolve doubts about
24. The Court reasoned:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievances is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike. . . . [Section 301(a)] expresses a federal policy that
federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf or against labor or-
ganizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.
353 U.S. at 455.
The subsequent enunciation of the presumption of arbitrability logically followed
from Lincoln Mills. See note 26 infra and accompanying text. Judicial recog-
nition of a pro-arbitration policy in Lincoln Mills also led courts to find implied no-
strike clauses when there was mandatory arbitration, and waivers of the union's right
to honor a picket line. See note 37 infra. See generally Keene, supra note 17; Note,
Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L.
Rnv. 636 (1972).
25. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), noted in Meltzer, The Supreme
Court, Arbitration & Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 464 (1961); The Su-
preme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAv. L. REV. 81, 181 (1960); 2 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REv. 359 (1961). For a discussion why these cases are a "trilogy," see note 27 infra.
26. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
Justice Douglas explained the relationship between arbitration and the national labor
policy:
The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the col-
lective bargaining agreement. . . . A major factor in achieving industrial
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in a collective
bargaining agreement.
. . . For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements
is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
Id. at 578.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S.
254 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); NAPA Pitts-
burgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1049 (1974).
27. Justice Douglas stated the presumption:
An order to arbitrate should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)
(footnote omitted).
All of the Trilogy cases involved bargaining agreements that provided for the arbitra-
tion of all disputes between the parties over the meaning, interpretation, and application
of all provisions of the agreements. Matters that were strictly a function of manage-
ment, however, were excluded from arbitration. In Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the
Court applied the presumption of arbitrabiity to the union's grievance about the employ-
er's contracting-out policy-arguably a prerogative of management not subject to arbitra-
tion under the terms of the agreement. 363 U.S. at 583.
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coverage of arbitration agreements, thus expanding section 301(a) and
Lincoln Mills. Specific performance of a no-strike clause was denied,
however, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.3 Instead of attempting
to accommodate section 301(a) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Court found the Norris-LaGuardia Act an absolute bar against injunc-
tive relief.29  In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,30 which
involved a strike aimed at undermining mandatory arbitration,31 the
Court overruled Sinclair and held that an injunction was proper. By
The National Labor Relations Board applied the presumption to withhold considera-
tion of an alleged unfair labor practice until it had been arbitrated. Collyer Insulated
Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); cf. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
For a discussion of the role of the presumption in Boys Markets injunctions, see note
37 infra.
28. 370 U.S. 195 (1962), noted in The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L
REv. 54, 205-10 (1962); 47 MiNN. L. REv. 643 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REV. 247
(1962).
29. Congress' refusal to repeal or amend the Norris-LaGuardia Act led the Sinclair
majority to conclude that neither Lincoln Mills nor the Steelworkers Trilogy compelled
a modification of the Norris-LaGuardia bar to injunctions. 370 U.S. at 213.
Justice Brennan's dissent argued for an accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
with § 301(a). Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Eight years later in Boys Markets, his view formed the basis for overrul-
ing Sinclair. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See note 30 infra and accompanying text. One
possible explanation of the Sinclair decision is that the Court applied the "plain meaning
rule" of statutory construction. See generally Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpreta-
tion and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE LJ. 1547,
1549 (1963).
30. 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunc-
tions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970). See also Axelrod, supra note 5. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Brennan criticized Sinclair, and concluded that it made no "viable contri-
bution" to federal labor policy. Id. at 249. He predicated overruling on three grounds.
First, the Sinclair decision disregarded the Court's emphasis on the congressional policy
of promoting arbitration. Second, without the possibility of an injunction, employers
could not effectively enforce collective bargaining agreements. Finally, when taken in
conjunction with Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 577 (1968) (removal of suits
involving labor disputes to federal court where they were subject to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act), Sinclair displaced the jurisdiction of state courts, contrary to the intent
of the framers of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and precluded injunctive relief in any court.
398 U.S. at 241-49.
In Boys Markets the Court rejected the union's argument that employers could rely
on damage suits to protect their interests because such suits were ineffective substitutes
for injunctions. Id. at 248. See Wellington & Albert, supra note 29, at 1558; Spelfogel,
Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Action and Discipline, 7 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 239 (1966).
31. 398 U.S. at 243. The union demanded certain changes in the work procedure
that were subject to compulsory arbitration. When the company offered to arbitrate the
grievance, the union refused and called a strike. The company promptly sought an in-
junction.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/6
792 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:786
limiting injunctions to instances in which parties were contractually
bound to arbitrate the grievance over which the strike arose, 2 the
holding retained the anti-injunctions essence of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act while accommodating the pro-arbitration policy of section
301(a).33
In the wake of Boys Markets, courts have disagreed whether a
sympathy strike can be enjoined. 4 One group of cases denied injunc-
tive relief because the sympathy strike was not over an arbitrable
grievance, 5 reasoning that to hold otherwise would extend Boys Mar-
32. Id. at 253. The Court imposed several other prerequisites to injunctive relief:
a mandatory arbitration provision in the agreement, the employer's willingness to submit
to arbitration once the injunction is issued, and judicial determination that the injunction
is warranted by equitable considerations. Id. at 254.
33. By imposing these limitations, see note 32 supra, the Court restricted its holding
in a way consistent with the opinion's underlying rationale of reconciling conflicting po-
icies. But see 16 VL. L REv. 176, 185-86 (1970) (Boys Markets was "major intrusion
into" Norris-LaGuardia because it allowed injunction "contrary to the literal reading of
the anti-injunction provision"). See generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions,
and Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 S. Cr. Rnv. 215; Note, supra note 20.
34. Although Buffalo Forge was a case of first impression in the Second Circuit,
the court recognized the division among other courts. 517 F.2d at 1209 n.3. Some
courts denied injunctive relief. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d
1372 (5th Cir. 1972); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D.
Md. 1971); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H.
1970). Other courts issued injunctions. Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505
F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974), noted in 1974-75 Annual Survey of Labor Relations & Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 965, 1046 (1975); NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1049 (1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir.
1973); Barnard College v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). That
division extends beyond the issue whether a sympathy strike should be subject to a Boys
Markets injunction. Indeed, it is grounded on differing interpretations of the scope of
Boys Markets. See Axelrod, supra note 5; notes 35 & 37 infra.
35. Although an arbitrable grievance might be found, it would be the result rather
than the underlying cause of the strike. For example, the strike itself might be held
to be arbitrable. The mere discovery of an arbitrable grievance, however, would not
lead to an injunction since the strike could not be said to be over an arbitrable grievance.
Absent a determination that there exists a cause-effect relationship in which the strike
is caused by an arbitrable grievance, these courts would refuse to issue a Boys Markets
injunction. See Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographers, Local 53, 520 F.2d
1220 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3286 (Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 565);
Gary-Hobart Water Co. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 269
(1975); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972);
Johnson Builders Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1970); Stokely-
Van Camp, Inc. v. Thacker, 394 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Carnation Co. v.
Teamsters Local 949, 381 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.
v. Local 560, Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19 (D.NJ. 1974); General Cable Co. v. IBEW
Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971). The NLRB has adopted this "underlyingWashington University Open cholarship
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kets to all disputes.36 Other opinions stressed the importance of arbitra-
tion in national labor relations and applied a presumption of arbitrabili-
ty.7 Consequently, sympathy strikes would fall within the Boys
cause" requirement. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742 (1974), enforced,
511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 269 (1975).
Some decisions foreshadowed the approach of the Buffalo Forge court by implying
that injunction can also be denied without undermining a pro-arbitration labor policy.
See notes 49 & 57 infra.
36. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972);
New York Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971). See note
48 infra and accompanying text.
Many of the decisions which denied Boys Markets injunctions were efforts to preserve
the Supreme Court's characterization of its holding in Boys Markets as "narrow." See,
e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295, Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1971).
37. This presumption of arbitrability takes one of two forms. Some courts look to
the language of the arbitration provisions and apply the presumption to bring the dispute
within that language. The dispute itself is presumed arbitrable. The Supreme Court,
noting the strong pro-arbitration policy, applied the presumption to a safety dispute to
bring it within an arbitration clause covering "any local trouble of any kind arising at
the mine." Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1973). Lower courts encoun-
tering the same language (found in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement)
in sympathy strike situations generally have followed Gateway, applied the presumption,
and enjoined the dispute. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.
1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974); Inland Steel Co.
v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW,
494 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1974). But see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d
1236 (5th Cir. 1975).
Arbitration clauses in the coal mining industry are exceptionally broad. But other
decisions, involving the application of the presumption to more restrictively worded
clauses to produce the same result-an injunction-suggest that the application of the
presumption is not dependent on the wording of the arbitration clause. See Associated
Contractors v. Construction Local 563, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975) (refusal to cross
picket line created arbitrable issue); Valmac Indus. Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519
F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391,
497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839 (1974); Wilmington Shipping Co. v.
Longshoremen's Local 1429, 86 LR.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973)
(breach of no-strike clause an arbitrable issue, although the court stated that the issue
was so clearly arbitrable that an injunction would issue irrespective of the presumption);
Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972) (violation of no-strike
clause and capacity of both parties to initiate arbitration are arbitrable issues); Barnard
College v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (breach of no-
strike clause held a dispute "arising out of the interpretation or application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement").
Other courts, rather than applying the presumption to the language of the arbitration
provisions, cited it to justify an injunction granted out of deference to the pro-arbitration
element of national labor policy. See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926,
502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). See also Southwestern Bell
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Markets exception to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act and could be enjoined. 8
-Emphasizing the narrowness of the Boys Markets holding,s0 the court
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers0 determined that if a
strike is to be enjoined, it must be "over a grievance" that the parties
had agreed to arbitrate.4 1 The court found that the sympathy strike
Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 454 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971) ("arguable" arbi-
trable approach drew dispute within the coverage of arbitration). But see Standard
Food Prod. Corp. v. Branderburg, 436 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1970) (no injunction
when union presents a "colorable claim" that the underlying dispute is excluded from
arbitration).
Some courts have justified injunctions by inferring that the union waived its right to
honor a picket line when it agreed to a no-strike claose. Courts base that inference on
the pro-arbitration policy announced in Lincoln Mills and effectuated through the pre-
sumption. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, supra; Armco Steel Co. v. UMW, supra.
Such a finding of waiver is contrary to the general requirement that a waiver be clear
and unmistakeable. See N.L.R.B. v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393,
399 (7th Cir. 1971); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.LR.B., 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1963); Gary-Hobart Water Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 742
(1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 269 (1975); Axelrod,
supra note 5, at 923. See generally Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Pre-
sumption of Arbitrability, 85 HIv. L. Rnv. 636 (1972) (indiscriminate application of
the presumption would undermine narrowness of Boys Markets); Comment, Federal
Labor Policy and the Scope of the Prerequisites of a Boys Markets Injunction, 19 ST.
Lomis U.L.J. 328 (1975).
38. When courts have relied upon the presumption, injunctions have followed as a
matter of course. See note 37 supra.
With the exception of the Sixth Circuit, most courts have ignored the other prerequi-
sites to a Boys Markets injunction. See note 32 supra. Those decisions following Jus-
tice Brennan's guidelines have found injunctive relief unwarranted by equity since the
companies failed to show that the strikes would cause irreparable harm. See North Am.
Coal Corp. v. UMW, 497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974); Detroit Newspaper Pub. Ass'n v.
Detroit Typographers Union, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967
(1973). For an interesting discussion of an ignored element in equitable considerations,
see Abrams, The Labor Injunction and the Refusal to Cross Another Union's Picket
Lines, 26 CAsE W. Rns. L. REv. 178 (1975).
39. The court remarked:
In assessing the extent to which § 301(a) modified the anti-injunction policy
of Norris-LaGuardia, we base the tenor of our inquiry on the Court's emphasis
in Boys Market [sic] on the narrowness of its holding in favor of injunctive
relief.
517 F.2d at 1210. See note 36 supra.
40. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975).
41. 517 F.2d at 1210. In its petition for certiorari, plaintiff argued that this
language allowed injunctions only in situations in which the strike was over an arbi-
trable grievance initiated by the union. Thus, a "double standard" of arbitrability arose
under which employee-initiated grievances were arbitrable while the grievances of the
employer were not. Petitioner's Brief for Petition for Certiorari at 10, Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct 214 (1975). If the presumption of arbitrability
is applied to the issue whether the employer can invoke the arbitration procedures,
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stemmed from the union's respect for the picket lines rather than a
grievance with the company.42 From this finding, the court deduced that
there was neither an arbitrable dispute precipitating the stoppage nor
grounds for portraying the strike as an attempt to displace arbitration
procedures.4
3
The court also considered whether an injunction would promote
accommodation of the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia and
the pro-arbitration policy of section 301(a). 44  The court reasoned that
if it enjoined a sympathy strike "it is difficult to conceive of any strike
which could not be so enjoined." 45  Moreover, the court feared that
accommodation would become meaningless because injunctions would
"virtually obliterate" the Norris-LaGuardia Act.48 Having determined
however, petitioner's argument is refuted. In addition, a possible reading of Buffalo
Forge suggests that the court merely required that both the employer and the union be
bound by the arbitrator's decision, not that both parties be capable of initiating the
arbitration mechanism. See Avco Corp. v. Local 737, UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.
1972); Geo. A. Hormal & Co. v. Local P-31, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 349 F. Supp.
785 (N.D. Iowa 1972). But see Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court,
460 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1972); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp.
478 (D. Md. 1971).
42. 517 F.2d at 1210. Although the court cited no particular case, its approach cor-
responds with that applied in General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp.
478 (D. Md. 1971). See note 35 supra.
43. 517 F.2d at 1211. This characterization of sympathy strikes originated in
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(Hunter, J., & Seitz, CJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), and Inland
Steel Corp. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion).
44. By raising these policy considerations the court intended to avoid an "undue ex-
pansion of the 'narrow' holding in Boys Market. [sic]" 517 F.2d at 1211. It is un-
clear, however, whether the court thought that the analysis based on the "over a
grievance" requirement might unduly expand Boys Markets, or simply felt that the policy
arguments insured that the Court's holding would not be broadly construed. See note
35 supra.
45. 517 F.2d at 1211, quoting Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468
F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972). This conclusion would be true only if a Boys Mar-
kets injunction depended solely on an underlying grievance. Boys Markets, however,
also required that the parties have agreed to mandatory arbitration. See note 32 supra.
Moreover, courts may not infer such an agreement. Only when mandatory arbitration
was lacking would enjoining a sympathy strike ignore the Boys Markets prerequisites
and effect a de facto repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Associated Gen. Con-
tractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1974) (provision
requiring mutual consent for arbitration not mandatory; injunction denied); Emery Air
Freight Corp. v. Local 295, Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1971) (expired collective bargaining agreement precludes finding of mandatory
arbitration); see Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1971).
46. 517 F.2d at 1211.
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that the sympathy strike did not circumvent the arbitration procedures, 47
the court concluded that denial of an injunction would not impinge
upon the general policy favoring arbitration. 48  Therefore, the court
believed that its action maintained the vitality of Norris-LaGuardia
without offending pro-arbitration considerations.49
While the Second Circuit relied heavily on the reasoning of other
cases,s" its Buffalo Forge opinion shifted the emphasis to policy consid-
erations affected by the grant of an injunction."' Although Buffalo
47. Id. Although the facts in Buffalo Forge support this conclusion, it is question-
able whether it would follow in all instances. For example, a sympathy strike could
be merely a guise for pressuring an employer to yield on a grievance that is subject to
arbitration. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254
(E.D. Pa. 1973). See also NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d
321, 326 n.6 (3d Cir.) (Hunter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
48. 517 F.2d at 1211. In support of this conclusion the court cited two dissenting
opinions, NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324, 330-31
(3d Cir.) (Hunter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Inland Steel Co.
v. Local 1545, UMW, 502 F.2d 293, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
Judge Hunter's dissent convincingly illustrated why injunctions do not promote arbitra-
tion. Accepting the premise of the majority of the court in NAPA Pittsburgh that a
sympathy strike involves an arbitrable dispute, Judge Hunter nevertheless maintained
that injunctive relief was improper because the arbitrable dispute was not the underlying
cause of the strike. By definition, a sympathy strike does not attempt to defeat the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction, nor pressure the employer to forego arbitration and yield to the de-
mands of the union as in Boys Markets. A concession to the union would not halt the
work stoppage since the grievance between the primary union and the employer would
remain unresolved. 502 F.2d at 326.
Moreover, an injunction frustrates the aims of the Norris-LaGuardia Act without fur-
thering a pro-arbitration policy. Judge Hunter believed that the arbitration process
would suffer from the issuance of an injunction. Having obtained an injunction, the
employer would have achieved all that is possible, and has nothing to gain from arbitra-
tion. Given the costs of arbitration, the possibility of losing on the merits, and the re-
sumption of the strike, employers have a strong incentive to delay arbitration proceed-
ings. Id. at 328. In this setting, unions would be less willing to submit to arbitration
or enter into arbitration agreements-contrary to the congressional intent underlying
section 301(a). Furthermore, the NAPA Pittsburgh majority's broad interpretation of
Boys Markets would permit an employer to halt any work stoppage merely by alleging
that the strike itself was illegal under the contract. Note, Boys Markets: Developments
in the Third Circuit, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 281, 309 (1975).
49. 517 F.2d at 1211. Judge Hunter, dissenting in NAPA Pittsburgh, would
go beyond the Second Circuit's argument. He believed that denial of injunctive relief
is not merely consistent with a pro-arbitration policy, but actually promotes it by cre-
ating an incentive for employers to enter arbitration. 502 F.2d at 326. This argument
presupposes, however, an arbitrable dispute which the employer might win on the merits
in arbitration, thus ending the strike.
50. See cases cited notes 36 & 42 supra.
51. An awareness of the policy implications surrounding an injunction runs through-
out the Second Circuit's interpretation of Boys Markets. See Emery Air Freight Corp.Washington University Open Scholarship
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Forge and Boys Markets reached different conclusions, both cases
stressed policy accommodation.5 2  Furthermore, the court's conclusion
that refraining from enjoining the strike did not offend the pro-arbitra-
tion policy is strengthened by distinguishing the causes and effects of the
strikes in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge.53
The court correctly denied the injunction, but it failed to address
the applicability of the presumption of arbitrability.5 4 Although the
court logically reasoned that there was no underlying grievance be-
tween the parties because the dispute causing the sympathy strike in-
v. Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1006 (1971);
New York Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971). In con-
trast, many courts have denied injunctions on the ground that the sympathy strike does
not arise over an arbitrable grievance. That determination implies certain policy consid-
erations, but its principal focus is factual. Although the two approaches-factual and
policy-are ultimately interdependent, policy considerations dominated the reasoning of
Buffalo Forge.
52. By emulating the accomodation approach of Boys Markets, Buffalo Forge
avoided a one-sided analysis, and reinforced the essence of the former's argument. The
impact of an injunction was considered, but not at the expense of ignoring any impact
on the pro-arbitration policy. This policy-centered approach explains why Boys
Markets is inapplicable to the facts of Buffalo Forge. It also parries the criticism that
the court mechanically limits Boys Markets to comparable factual patterns. In con-
trast, decisions that deny injunctions because of an emphasis on factual determinations
are susceptible to such criticism. See Note, The Fruits of Boys Markets, supra note 14.
53. Although the court did not explicitly distinguish the factual setting of the two
cases, there is a strong indication that factual differences account for the distinguishable
effects of an injunction on promoting arbitration. Compare Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1208 (2d Cir. 1975), with Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970). The cases can also be reconcilcd by view-
ing Buffalo Forge as falling within the statement in Boys Markets "that injunctive relief
is [not] appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable
grievance." 398 U.S. at 253-54.
54. An application of the presumption would probably dictate an injunction. See
note 37 supra. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the court found the presumption re-
buttable in the sympathy strike context. The line of cases in which the doctrine has
been considered indicates that the presumption is irrebuttable in practice, if not in fact.
A policy argument, that the necessity of retaining the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes
the application of the presumption, could be inferred from the Buffalo Forge opinion.
This argument was rejected, however, by the Supreme Court's sustaining the issuance of
an injunction based on the presumption in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368
(1973). Compare Abrams, supra note 38, at 182 (reading Gateway as mandating appli-
cation of the presumption to Boys Markets situations), with NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 331-32 (3rd Cir.) (Hunter, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). Abrams' analysis begs the question: What is a Boys
Markets situation? See generally Note, supra note 37; note 48 supra.
Moreover, by failing to consider the effect of the presumption, the court avoided an
opportunity to indicate why the presumption is inapplicable to sympathy strikes. See
note 58 infra.
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volved the employer and another union,5" this analysis becomes truly
compelling only when carried to its logical conclusion. The court should
have proceeded to acknowledge that no grievance could have been re-
solved by submitting the secondary dispute to arbitration. The pre-
sumption of arbitrability should not apply to the question whether the
,sympathy strike falls within the coverage of the no-strike clause.10 Nor
should the breach of a no-strike clause create an arbitrable issue justify-
ing a Boys Markets injunction.57 The presumption of arbitrability is
inapplicable, as a matter of fact, when there is no underlying grievance
55. The court recognized this distinction, but failed to see its full implication. See
text accompanying note 42 supra. See also Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1972); Parade Pub., Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers
Local 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1972).
56. Boys Markets recognized that the no-strike clause, express or implied, is the
quid pro quo for the employer's agreement to submit to arbitration. 398 U.S. at 248.
Lincoln Mills stated that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes [was] the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike." 353 U.S. at 454. Taken together, these deci-
sions strike a balance, and suggest that the scope of the no-strike clause should extend
only so far as necessary to preserve that balance. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 106 (1962) ("A no-strike agreement is [not] to be implied beyond
the area . . . exclusively covered by compulsory terminal arbitration"). Expanding
the scope of the no-strike clause to sympathy strikes by applying the presumption upsets
that balance since the union cannot submit the underlying grievance to arbitration.
Thus the scope of the no-strike clause is an inappropriate issue for arbitration. More-
over, no purpose would be served by submitting the sympathy strike to arbitration once
the question of the scope of the no-strike clause was recognized as an inappropriate
subject for arbitration. This point can be clearly illustrated. Suppose E represents the
employer, 0 the union which originally struck, and S the union engaged in the sympathy
strike. The grievance prompting the sympathy strike is between E and 0. If the strike
is enjoined, E and S could only arbitrate the grievance that prompted the strike, but that
grievance involves E and 0. Therefore, any resolution between E and S will fail to
resolve the grievance since O is not a party to arbitration. S might reach an agreement
with E that the underlying dispute between 0 and E should be resolved in B's favor,
but 0, not being a party to the decision, is not bound. Requiring S to arbitrate would
delay or circumvent any discussion of the real grievance between E and 0. See Pilot
Freight Cariers, Inc. v. Local 560, Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19 (D.N.J. 1974). See also
Note, Boys Markets Injunctions in Sympathy Strike Situations, supra note 14, at 652.
57. Had the mere breach of the no-strike clause been considered an arbitrable issue,
the Supreme Court would not have had to establish the Boys Markets guidelines. The
breach of a no-strike clause, by itself, cannot create an arbitrable issue on which a Boys
Markets injunction should issue. To hold that the breach is an arbitrable issue
upon which a Boys Markets injunction could be issued would allow employers to
secure injunctions at will since they could always claim a breach without showing an
express no-strike clause. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974);
see Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Moreover, if the
grievance is the very legality of the strike, and the district court must find this illegality
to enjoin the strike, there is then nothing remaining for the arbitrator to decide. Note,
Boys Markets Injunctions in Sympathy Strike Situations, supra note 14, at 671.
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between the sympathetic union and the employer."
By affirming the narrowness of the Boys Markets holding, Buffalo
Forge retained the Norris-LaGuardia Act as an element of national
labor policy. 9 Resolution of the disagreement among the courts awaits
the Supreme Court's disposition of Buffalo Forge during the current
term.60 Its decision may carry ramifications beyond the area of sympa-
thy strikes since contempt proceedings 61 and politically-inspired strikes62
involve many of the same considerations. In the meantime, unions
within the Second Circuit can engage in sympathy strikes while employ-
er's reliance on a Boys Markets injunction is curtailed.
58. There are several reasons why the presumption should not be used to de-
termine whether a sympathy strike should be enjoined. The presumption was not
applied in Boys Markets, but simply cited as evidence of the strong pro-arbitration con-
siderations in labor policy. 398 U.S. at 242-43. To apply the presumption would be
inconsistent with Boys Markets' accommodation of both statutes, because application of
the presumption would erase all restrictions on the Court's holding and obliterate the
Norris-LaGuardia Act for all practical purposes. See note 37 supra.
Showing that the presumption is factually inapplicable eliminates the argument that
its application justifies an injunction. See note 57 supra. Decisions that rely on the
presumption to support their policy arguments are refuted by the Buffalo Forge argument
that an injunction does not further arbitration. Therefore, no reason remains for issuing
a Boys Markets injunction against a sympathy strike.
59. After the Second Circuit's decision, the Sixth Circuit relied on Buffalo Forge
to deny an injunction. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographers, Local 53, 520
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3286 (Oct. 2, 1975) (No.
565).
60. In the view of one court, any change with respect to the status of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act must come from Congress. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560
Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19, 28 (D.N.J. 1974). Given the Court's action in Boys Markets,
however, it is doubtful that the Court will feel obliged to defer decision on this issue
to Congress. Cf. Wellington & Albert, supra note 29, at 1563. On the basis of the
Court's denial of certiorari in several cases in which injunctions were granted, one com-
mentator predicts that Buffalo Forge will be reversed. See Axelrod, supra note 5, at
920 n.206.
61. See Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1784, UMW, 514 F.2d 763 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975). But
see United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. UMW, 397 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
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